For an outline on this case and links to other posts and the transcript, see the Case Law Database

This is a case concerning what sort of accommodation a local authority can provide as temporary accommodation pursuant to Section 193 of the Act and whether someone can be intentionally homeless as a result of losing that accommodation. It reinforces how important it is for applicants not to refuse or move out of temporary accommodation but to take up any offers and challenge suitability after having moved in. There will obviously were it is impossible for a client to live in a property, and they cannot be expected to accept an offer of it. An example would be where someone who has mobility problems preventing them from climbing stairs is offered a property above the ground floor with no lift and only stairs access. In most cases though applicants should be aware that the Courts are likely to recognise the pressure which councils are under and support them in finding people to have unreasonably refused offers of accommodation and to have become intentionally homeless as a result

Mr Beach applied to South Hams District Council for housing. They accepted a duty to him under Section 193 of the Act because at the time of the decision, he was expected to have two of his children living with him. He was offered accommodation in a seaside hotel at a time when his children were living with their mother. Despite objecting to the accommodation as suitable, he spent one night there. He then failed to return. The offer letter had warned him that non-occupation of the room would be treated as a breach of the terms of occupation. The council therefore decided that he was intentionally homeless and not entitled to any further assistance. Mr. Beach appealed on the basis that hotel accommodation of this kind could not constitute accommodation generally and/or, in particular, was not reasonable for him to continue to occupy, so he could not be intentionally homeless. He lost.

This will come as a surprise to many people who would not have expected someone to be treated as intentionally homeless for having to leave hotel accommodation, especially where they were expected to have children living with them. However, if the decision is broken down, it appears to make sense.

The starting point is Section 191 of the Act – which defines intentionally homeless. According to Section 191(1) 5 questions needed to be asked

1. Did the Mr Beach deliberately do or fail to do something?
2. Did he cease to occupy the room at the Seascape as a result?
3. Was that room “accommodation”?
4. Was it “available for his occupation”?
5. Would it have been “reasonable for him to continue to occupy” the room?

The answers to these according to the Court were:

1. Yes. He failed to occupy the hotel room, having been advised of the consequences of not doing so.
2. Yes. His booking was cancelled as a result of the non occupation
3. Yes. This was accommodation. This was accepted by counsel for Mr Beach
4. Yes. It was available, and he would have been able to continue to occupy it had he occupied it.
5. Yes. Although Mr. Beach was entitled to be treated as having children reside with him at some point in the future, it was clear to the council that they were not living with him or expected to reside with him shortly at the time when the offer of hotel accommodation was made. The council was therefore entitled to treat it as being reasonable for him to occupy it for a short time whilst arrangements were made for his children to live with him and for suitable accommodation to be offered.

It is worth having a closure look at the earlier case law to see how we got here in terms of court decisions.

In R v Brent LBC, ex parte Awua [1996] , which was decided under the corresponding provisions of the Housing Act 1985, the House of Lords held that accommodation which it would be reasonable for a person to continue to occupy did not have to be settled or permanent. This meant that losing temporary accommodation could give rise to intentionally homeless.

In Birmingham City Council v Ali and Others ; Moran v Manchester City Council 2009 the House of Lords held that “suitability” for the purposes of s193(2) did not imply permanence or security of tenure, that a local housing authority could satisfy its duty under that subsection by providing temporary accommodation, and that accommodation which it might be unreasonable for a person to occupy for a long period might be reasonable for him to occupy for a short period. It was in Ali that the court found that a property would be unsuitable but nevertheless reasonable to continue to occupy for a short time.

In Hodge v Folkestone and Hythe DC [2023] the court confirmed that whether the place occupied by a person is “accommodation” for the purposes of s191(1), and whether it is reasonable for a person to continue to occupy temporary accommodation are questions of fact for the local housing authority, subject to Wednesbury unreasonableness.

In Kyle  v Coventry CC 2023 the local housing authority had provided accommodation comprising a bedroom, with shared facilities, in a house which was occupied by recovering drug addicts (such as the claimant) and in which support and advice could be provided as needed. The authority determined that its main housing duty was at an end because the claimant had made himself intentionally homeless by behaving in a way which led to his eviction. On appeal, the claimant argued that it was not reasonable for him to continue to occupy the accommodation because it was analogous to accommodation in a women’s refuge, and because the accommodation had a ‘no visitors’ policy, restricted smoking, and was only available for a short period.

It is difficult to square this case and Kyle before it with the case of Ali where the Court held that a woman could otherwise be intentionally homeless from a women’s refuge because of the harsh terms under which she was expected to live there. These included not being allow to disclose her address, not to have visitors and being subject to eviction without Court Order at short notice. These conditions were actually similar to those imposed on Mr Kyle.

I think that the key features of the cases which make sense of the approach are:-

1. Ms Moran in the Ali case was a victim of domestic violence with two children and it was not clear why she had to leave the refuge beyond having an argument with a member of staff As such she was a much more sympathetic figure than Mr Kyle was was a Class A drug user who was alleged to have been stealing from other residents and against Mr Beach who was reported to have arrived at the hotel intoxicated.
2. Ms Moran had obtained the women’s refuge place without input from the council and might therefore have been therefore a long time if she had not left herself. Mr Kyle and Mr Beach had been provided with their accommodation by the councils they had applied to and could therefore expect that if they had concerns about suitability they could take these up with the council and ask for alternative accommodation.  In Ali (para 34) the question was considered of whether section 175(3) means that a person is only homeless if she has accommodation which it is not reasonable for her to occupy another night? Or does it mean that she can be homeless if she has accommodation which it is not reasonable for her to continue to occupy for as long as she would occupy it if the local authority did not intervene? In Moran there was no indication that the council would intervene in the foreseeable future as she had not made an application to the council yet. In Kyle and Beach there was every reason to believe that suitable accommodation would be provided in the foreseeable future or at least when required in Mr Beach’s case.

These cases establish that you can become intentionally homeless a result of losing temporary accommodation even where that accommodation would be unreasonable for you to occupy for more than a short time. It is for the local authority to decide and how long it is reasonable to continue to occupy it for and the courts will usually only interfere with that decision on Wednesbury Grounds. That is to say it is an irrational decision which no reasonable person could have come to.

An interesting additional point arising from this case is that the court appeared to accept that where a person has been found to be in priority need for reasons that change, there is no legal mechanism for the council to decide that they are no longer in priority need – see page 103 – but it was held that this was not directly relevant to this case and would be a question for another day.