I have had a list of solicitors which I give to people whose cases I can’t take for a while. I have now put it on the site .  You can access it via the link at the top of the page.

I hope to add to the list so please let me know the contact details of anyone you think should be added. I can amend the list to include organisations outside London if I get the details.

At the bottom of the page is a link to the list as a Google Document which you should be able to print or copy. Please let me know if you can’t.

Here is a very valuable document for anyone who like me regularly issues homelessness appeals in the Central London County Court pursuant to Section 204 of the Housing Act 1996.

For years I have had to worry about ensuring that hard copies of the Court papers were received at the Court within 21 days of the date when the Section 202 Review decision letter was received. That now appears to be a thing of the past. Here is the letter as a PDF.

I am extremely grateful to Mrs Begum at the Court for providing a very detailed response to my queries about whether Appellant Notices and supporting documents can be sent to the Court by email as PDFs or whether it is still necessary for hard copies to be sent to the Court. As can be seen from her letter of 15 January, the answer is that they can as long as you have a PBA Account with HM Courts & Tribunal Service for paying the fee.

So far there has only been limited guidance available from the Courts as to what can and can’t be issued digitally. Please leave a comment if you are aware of any other guidance. All I had been able to find was the Courts Email Guidance. The attached letter was sent after I had to complain after Central London County Court initially accepted and then sent back an Appeal which I had issued by sending papers by email only. I had been sending Application Notice in this way and having them issued without problems.. My complaint led to the Court agreeing to issue my appeal. As part of the complaint I asked for clarification of the Court’s approach.

When I wrote to the Court I referred them to the  Bryan McGuire QC memorial lecture on homelessness given by HHJ Jan Luba QC in April 2017 (Link here) which set out at paragraph 111 a number of very useful Pointers For Appellants. These included a request to cut down on paper work and help save the rain forests. I asked for guidance on those like me who act for appellants might take up the call. I have had a further response from HHJ Luba QC in which he reminds me that Ms Begum as a court official should not be treated as stating what the actual Court procedure is but only as setting her understanding of it. He also suggested that at some point in the future the Courts will be accepting Appeal Bundles in digital format. I think that they should have started doing this some years ago but I am very glad that they are at least allowing us to issue by email.

Since receiving the above letter I have set another appeal to Central London County Court for issue without sending any paper copies. I sent an email to the address: enquiries@centrallondon.countycourt.gsi.gov.uk  which set out the following text:

Part 3 of The Immigration Act 2014 is likely to come into force nationally shortly following a 6 month pilot in the West Midlands.  I won’t go into detail about the Act here. Further information can be obtained from blog posts by  Nearly Legal – Tessa Shepperson – Trisan Hyatt at Invictus Chambers  and from the You.Gov website. In a nutshell, the Act provides that landlords who rent properties to tenants who do not have leave to enter or remain in the UK will be liable to be fined. This is designed to stop private landlords from renting properties to anyone who cannot show that are entitled to be in the UK.

As with previous initiatives to make like difficult for migrants this Act is likely to add to the existing burden on local authority Social Services Departments in providing assistance to those poorest members of society who are excluded from mainstream benefits and services.  It will once again fall to Social Services staff to prevent people who have children with them or have special needs from becoming street homeless. This is because Schedule 3 of the Act excludes certain tenancy agreements from those which cannot be let to persons without leave to enter remain. These include accommodation provided by local authorities.

Paragraph 7(1) excludes from the reach of the Act any agreement—

(a)under which accommodation is provided to a person as a result of a duty or relevant power that is imposed or conferred on a local authority by an enactment (whether or not provided by the local authority), and
(b) which is not excluded by another provision of this Schedule.
(2) “Relevant power” means a power that is exercised for, or in connection with, a purpose of providing accommodation to a person who is homeless or is threatened with homelessness
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) the reference to a person who is homeless or is threatened with homelessness is to be read in accordance with—
(a) in relation to England and Wales, section 175 of the Housing Act 1996;
(b) in relation to Scotland, section 24 of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987;
(c) in relation to Northern Ireland, Article 3 of the Housing (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 (S.I. 1988/1990 (N.I. 23)).

This is going to mean that overstayers or other persons who are not able to obtain private sector accommodation directly from private landlords or letting agencies and are facing street homeless are going to have to apply to Social Services for assistance. This is of course already happening where the persons not have enough money to obtain or keep a private tenancy. To these persons there will now be added those who would have been able to afford to pay for private accommodation but cannot find a landlord who is willing to take them on because of the new Act.

I say that it will be Social Services who have to do the work because staff in Housing Departments are generally able to refuse to provide any assistance where the applicant is not “eligible” for housing  due their immigration status pursuant to  Section 185 of the Housing Act 1996.   Unlike their colleagues in the Housing Department, the staff in the Social Services Department must assist these applicants even if they are excluded from receiving assistance under Schedule 3 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 where a breach of their human rights would arise if assistance was withheld. Those who might have been housed under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996 because they have children living them will be seeking accommodation by way of assistance under Children Act 1989 and those who would have been housed due to medical conditions rendering them vulnerable would be asking for accommodation under the Care Act 2014.

Social Services Departments in many London Boroughs have already had to set up No Recourse To Public Funds teams to deal with persons facing destitution because their immigration status prevents them from receiving mainstream housing and benefits. They have to try and find housing for those applicants whom they are not able to turn away in the same way that the Housing Department can.  This already places a considerable strain on staff who only have limited resources and are unlikely to have very much housing training. Although it is common for Social Services Departments or Legal Departments to write to me saying that Social Services are not  “quasi letting agency” the Immigration Act 2014 takes them another step along the way to becoming just that.

Social Services Department staff will soon face further demands for assistance from people whose only needs are housing related in that they cannot obtain private sector tenancies or social housing. Staff will have to find landlords for these persons and arrange for a tenancy to be granted for them in a way that brings it within Paragraph 7 of Schedule 3 of the new Act.  If they are able to do so they will be acting as a filter which negates the effect of the Immigration Act 2014 by bringing the new tenancy agreement within the class of excluded agreements set out in Schedule 3 and allowing the landlord to grant a tenancy to the person because it is now provided as a consequence of a duty or power imposed or conferred upon a local authority. Alternatively, if a private landlord cannot be found they are going to have to house the applicants themselves.

A practical step for Social Services  staff might be to provide homeless persons without leave to remain who can find landlords with a letter indicating that the council will be able to assist in endorsing a request for the tenancy if necessary if the landlord were minded to grant it but for the risk of a fine under the Immigration Act 2014. Having said that it is likely that by breaking cover and having to reveal their immigration status in order to avoid homelessness an overstayer would become known to the authorities and have to stop working pending the outcome of an application for leave to remain in the UK. This is likely to cut off their income and stop them from being able to afford to pay for private accommodation themselves. As such they will be added to the large group of people facing destitution without assistance and funding from Social Services.

After reading the the Nearly Legal post this week on R (Faizi) v Brent LBC I thought I would write something about how I have found Section 204A of the Housing Act 1996 to be of no use to homeless persons trying to avoid the loss of their temporary accommodation while they appealed against a decision that they were not entitled to be housed.

The interesting thing about the Faizi case as spotted by Nearly Legal was that Hadon-Cave J refused the application for Judicial Review based on consideration of the issues which Ms Fazi had raised instead of dismissing it for the more obvious reason that she had issued proceedings in the wrong Court. This would be because she was not entitled to apply for Judicial Review as she had a right of appeal to the County Court under Section 204A of the Housing Act 1996.

After looking up the old case law I remembered that the two leading cases on Section 204A appeals were infact Judicial Reviews themselves. Those are R v Camden LBC Ex p Mohammed [1997] 30 HLR 315 and R v Brighton and Hove Council Ex p Nacion (1999) 31 HLR 1095.  This was because they concerned the exercise of the council’s discretion to accommodate the applicant pending the outcome of a Section 202 Review where the challenge does have to be made by way of Judicial Review proceedings unlike the exercise of what is effectively the same discretion to house pending appeal which has to be challenged in the County Court under Section 204 of the Housing Act 1996.

Things started off alright back in 1997 with Mohammed where it was held that in considering whether to exercise its discretion to house the council should consider three questions:-

(1) the merits of the substantive case,
(2) whether there was new material on review that could effect the decision,
(3) the personal circumstances of the applicant.

After considering the facts of the the case the Court held that the decision not to accommodate pending review was unlawful. That seems fair enough.

Things took a severe turn for the worse two years later in Nacion where the Court of Appeal held that as long as the council had addressed the three questions set above as identified in Mohammed any challenge of the refusal to accommodate pending review would be almost certain to fail.

Tuckey LJ said:  “Where a council, as in this case, has obviously considered the material factors… identified in [R v Camden LBC Ex p Mohammed], it is an entirely futile exercise to seek to say that in some way that discretion was wrongly exercised by coming to the High Court for judicial review and saying, as this applicant does, ‘We have an arguable case on the appeal to the County Court’. Applications for judicial review on this basis should be strongly discouraged. It is only in a very exceptional case that there will really be any reasonable prospect of interesting the court by way of judicial review to interfere with the exercise of the very broad discretion which the council have …”

In the same case, Lord Woolf MR said: “If an authority refuses even to consider exercising its discretion… then I can understand that judicial review may be an appropriate remedy. Apart from that situation, I have difficulty in envisaging cases where application for judicial review will be appropriate.”

My reading of this is that where the council can show that they have ticked the box marked “thought about it”  and have not made some gross error in doing so the Courts will not interfere with their decision. This is because the court will only consider whether the three questions have been answered and not how the council answered them.

In 2003 the Court of Appeal held in Francis v Kensington & Chelsea LBC [2003] 2 All ER 1052 that the principles set out in Nacion in relation to accommodation pending review should be applied by the County Court when considering an appeal under Section 204A and that was that. Since then I have not heard of Section 204A being of any use to anybody.  Presumably some people have won appeals which I have not heard about but you would have to be a very brave barrister to advise that a case had a good prospect of success of passing Tuckley LJ’s almost impossible test. Further details of the obstacles that these cases put in the way of homeless persons can be found on this article on the Hardwicke Chambers web site from 2003. I am not aware of any cases since then which have improved the situation.

The ruling in Nacion and Tuckey LJ’s and Woolf MR’s comments reflect extremely badly on the judiciary. Where Parliament has created rights of review and appeal for homeless persons against decisions to deny them assistance which they are entitled to it should not be an “entirely futile” exercise and persons should not be “strongly discouraged” from asking a Judge to require a council to give effect to those rights. It is a great injustice if applicants have to become street homeless whilst waiting for a review or appeal decision to overturn an unlawful refusal to house them.

The good news is that where homeless applicants face the loss of their temporary accommodation pending review or appeal they may still get some protection from street homelessness from the Courts if they have children or if they are vulnerable on medical grounds and the council refuses them temporary accommodation. The secondary duties/powers which councils have to assist such persons under the Children Act 1989 and more gently the Children Act 2004 and Care Act 2014 are open to enforcement through Judicial Review and do not face the same restrictions as apply to Section 204A.